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The Editor has at least two apologies to make this month, the first for an unanticipated but (unlike that of October 1982 [LCM 7.8, p.109; cf. 7.9, p.125] intentional alteration in the format, which really is being made for 'technical reasons': the printer has acquired new equipment which means that reduction can be carried out on the premises, and no longer farmed out, BUT (there is always a snag) by 20% not 15, with the results which will be evident to readers. However, this bad news, if such it is, may be countered by the fact that the Editor is becoming convinced that, in order in part to satisfy his contributors by reducing the back-log and ensuring that it does not build up to such an extent in future, he must increase the size of LCM, though not until next year, the dreaded 1984. Again there is a snag: it will have to cost more (for one thing postage is going up anyway, and a larger number will in any case mean increased postal charges). He proposes an increase to £5 and, pro rata, \$12.50 for surface mail (he has not yet been able to work out the air mail increase which in any case only affects a very few subscribers, to whose number 4 have been added since February, with one cancellation, which seems to make 374, but he would not swear to that figure). This announcement of intention will give subscribers plenty of time to say whether they welcome the increase in size (if not in price) or would prefer to maintain the status quo.

The second apology is for the lateness of this number. Readers in Provincial Universities in this country (the Editor was recently reproved for referring to an hotel in Wales as a typical English provincial hotel) will realize that this is the month of examination setting, and need no further explanation. But the Editor also lost time by having to finish off an MS for another editor, and also by attending the meeting of Hibernian Hellenists at Ballymascanlon, a gathering inaugurated by Professor Huxley of The Queen's University of Belfast twenty years ago. The Editor is not clear whether attendance makes him an honorary Irishman, but enjoys doing his bit to foster links between the two islands.

Such meetings and conferences burgeon. There is one on Theophrastus at Liverpool at the end of this month, one on ancient historians in April at Leeds (where Professor Mattingly already arranges regular seminars, as does Professor Jocelyn at Manchester), the Syme-feast in Oxford in the same month, and Ancient Philosophers, regionally divided, hold gatherings in North and South. All this is a *Priamel* (εἰ δ' ἄεθλα γάρουεν | ἔλθεαι, φίλον ἦτορ) to an announcement of the colloquium of Professor Cairns' LIVERPOOL LATIN SEMINAR to be held at Liverpool on Friday 29 April, with the title *carmina Gallo?*. Eight papers - no less! - will be presented, on the context by Dr.R.A.Whitaker (Natal), lines 6-7 by Mr S.Hinds (St John's College, Cambridge), Gallus and the *recusatio* by Professor J.K.Newman (Illinois) and Epilegomena by the Corpus Professor of Latin in the University of Oxford, Professor R.G.M.Nisbet, in the morning, and in the afternoon, Gallus and Arcadia by Dr Duncan F.Kennedy (Liverpool), Gallus in Virgil's *Eclogues* by Mr I.M.LeM. Du Quesnay (Birmingham - but on whose appointment to a Lectureship at Cambridge the Editor offers public congratulations), Gallomorphs in Virgil's *Bucolics* (the Editor wishes somebody would tell him and others what they ought to call that work) by Professor John Van Sickle (CCNY) and finally Professor Cairns himself on 'Gallus in Propertius?'. There is a long and distinguished list of *adfuturi*, Professors Geymonat (Siena), Jocelyn, Rudd and Skutsch, Drs Ewen Bowie, Anna Crabbe, Roger Green, Robert Maltby and James McKeown (since Dr Bowie requires a first name for identification all must have it), Messrs Heywoth and Howie, and Miss Frances Muecke (Sydney). Those who wish to add both length and distinction to the list should write to Professor Cairns 'signifying their intention to attend and stating their requirements (free overnight accommodation)'. The Editor is fascinated by the academic sociology of conferences but fortunately has no room to indulge his speculations.

I treat the poem as addressed to Horace for convenience: if Horace was content not to name the person to whom the poem is directed, that information is not essential to the matter of the poem. The Catullan allusion (N.-H. p.79; add Catullus 72.3) seems sufficient evidence to favour self address, as also the relation of the poem to Anacreon 417P.).

Horace *Odes* 2.5, an address about a young girl Lalage, begins with bull-like impetuosity, then a note of restraint is struck (*tolle cupidinem* 9) and explained by Horace's hope for an improvement in the situation in the future, based on the fact that the girl is approaching fruition (*currit enim* ... 13). This explanation, however, is not wholly convincing, as it is founded on a calculation which suggests that by the time Lalage will be ready to accept Horace he will be too old anyway. This is suggested especially by the savagery of the passage of time (*ferox* and *curr- it*; cf. Woodman, LCM 6.6 [Jun. 1981], 163), the tenses of *dempserit* and *apponet* (14-15; time will add to her years, but it will [already] have added to his), and by comparison of 13-15 with AP 175-6 (and 60ff., and *Epp.* 2.55-61); when Horace talks of the advance of time it is usually with emphasis on the loss brought. See N.-H. p.79 and at line 14; Macleod in Woodman & West, edd., *Creative imitation and Latin literature*, Cambridge 1979, 99-100; Jocelyn, LCM 5.9 (Nov. 1980), 199.

Accordingly a doubt is suggested that the *maritus* Lalage will be seeking (16) is not to be Horace (cf. Macleod 100). There is nothing in the word *maritum* to endorse a specific implication: it remains ambiguous, able to refer to Horace or to be a general reference to 'a husband' (other than Horace). N.-H. assert that *te* must be implied in *maritum* in order to preserve balance in a tricolon, *iam tibi* (10), *iam te* (13), *iam ... maritum* (15-16). As they observe in notes on 6, 10 and 20 the poem moves in a series of tricola, which are marked as follows: - *nondum ... nondum* .. *nec* (1-3), *circa ... nunc ... nunc* (5-7), *iam ... iam ... iam* ... (10-15: the series is concluded with *Pholoe ... Chloris ... Gyges* 18-21). Thus the third tricolon is marked with triple rather than double anaphora and this extra pointing allows for balance to be established whether or not *maritum* is taken to refer to *te*. The intervening change of tone from optimism (*iam te sequetur* 13) to thoughts of advancing age (*aetas annos tibi dempserit* 14-15) enhances the possibility that in the third limb of this tricolon we have a contrast between *tibi ... te* and *maritum* and not a balance of identity. In favour of such a contrast are the doubts already raised, and subsequent doubts about Lalage, her age and her feelings, to be discussed below (p.).

If we look through the earlier parts of the poem to see if such a possibility is hinted at, we notice a number of disconcerting equivocations. Horace says that Lalage is not yet ready for sex: yet at *Odes* 3.11 he makes oblique advances to a girl Lyde who is described in such similar terms to those used of Lalage (*quae velut latis equa trima campis | ludit exsultim metuitque tangi, | nuptiarum expers et adhuc proteruo | cruda marito* 9-12) that one deduces the same stage of physical development for both girls and therefore needs another reason for abstinence than hopeful patience: he did not wait for Lyde (cf. also Chloe in *Odes* 1.23).

nondum ... ualet looks like an idealistic impression of a girl's innocence, a natural touch. Lalage is described as a *iuuenca* (6). *iuuenca* at *Odes* 2.8.21 does not suggest unreadiness for sex, as Quinn notes in his commentary at *Odes* 2.5.1-9: he accepts that Lalage is sexually mature and explains the advice to wait, it seems, by referring the poem to marriage, but this reference is derived from the advice to wait (his note on 9-16, ad fin.). The argument lacks 'sociological probability' (Jocelyn loc.cit., of Fantham's basically similar argument), and ignores the equivocal nature of the advice.

Further suggestions of Lalage's readiness are forthcoming. *solantis aestum* (7) might suggest summer heat, or the girl's 'feverish emotion' (N.-H. ad loc.; cf. Quinn on *aestuosi* at Catullus 7.5), or even, in view of the metaphor of *taurus* and *iuenca*, an animal in heat. *iuencae* is in proximity with, and is the subject of the participial governing, *aestum*. Although *aestus* is not attested in this sense it is here a natural extension from its common sense of 'passion', and the verb *aestuo* is used of sexual excitement in animals by Pliny NH 10.102 (for *solantis aestum* cf. Catullus 2.7-8, and on heat in sexual metaphors and its physical basis see Henderson, *The maculate Muse*, New Haven 1975, 47-48). On the source of consolation, *fluuiis* (6), one might note that the image of girls in water is a perpetually common element of voyeuristic fantasy (cf. Ovid, M. 3.131-252, Martial 4.22, AP 5.60, for examples): for water as symbol and scenery in erotic poetry see Segal, *Landscape in Ovid's Metamorphoses* (*Hermes Einzelschrift* 23), Wiesbaden 1969, 23-33.

ludere ... praegestientis (8-9) has obvious sexual connotations (for *prae-* see N.-H. on 9, and, for *salicto* [8], what they say ad loc.: 'a dense *salictum* might also give cover to a flirtatious or amorous girl'), and the probable gender of *uitulis* (8) stresses these. Lalage is at the stage, like Lyde and Chloe, where all that is needed for her to be 'broken in' is that she be 'broken in' (cf. Catullus 68.118 *qui tamen indomitam ferre iugum docuit*).

In addition, *immitis uuae* (10) suggests the fable of sour grapes (N.-H. p.78 & on 10). Grapes are a common metaphor or comparison for girls and attractive boys (AP 5.20, 124, 304, 12.205; Theocritus 11.21; cf. Ovid, M. 13.795; Catullus 17.16, 62.49ff.), and Horace's metaphor suggests one particular variety, the young girl - unripe grape *topos*. But *immitis* of fruit means 'harsh' or 'bitter' as opposed to 'sweet' (cf. Pliny, NH 13.26; at Gellius 10.11.3 *matura*, 'ripe' is opposed to *cruda*, 'unripe', and *immitis*, 'bitter'), and not 'unripe' as opposed to 'ripe' (Tibullus 1.3.55 uses the adjective of death to suggest both bitterness and untimeliness). Used of people, the word means 'harsh' or 'unkind', but not in itself 'young' or 'immature' (contra N.-H. on 10); it describes a girl who rejects a lover at *Odes* 1.33.2. Therefore Horace has chosen a word which, referred to the girl, does not primarily suggest immaturity and, referred to the grape, suggests bitterness as much as unripeness, and thus he has clearly indicated that his abstinence may well be a case of metaphorical 'sour grapes', and that Lalage may be ready for sex but not, for whatever reason, with him.

uitulis (8) now becomes understandable as a potential contemptuous dismissal of a rival or rivals (suspected or real), contemptuous both with regard to the generalizing plural and to the insinuation of immaturity (*uituli* are younger than *iuuencae*, Quinn on *Odes* 2.5.1-9). The heifer's frolicking with the calves may hide an uneasy awareness of (or belief in) Lalage's preference for a person or persons unknown, but the metaphor's affectation of contempt and indifference allows Horace to proceed with his optimistic *iam te sequetur* (13). One may also note that if *proterua* is nominative it could still describe Lalage in the present, even against *petet*.

Although one level of meaning in this poem is *tempore difficiles ueniunt ad aratra iuuenoi* (Ovid, *AA* 1.471), it is not the only level. If the girl's youth is not a reason for the speaker's abstinence which satisfies us, it is possible to see in his notice of his own age a doubt about his chances of success with Lalage (*ferox* and *currit* [13] are more forceful than a simple equation of loss and redress merits) which either prepares for his full realization that she is not for him in *petet maritum* (16, understanding *maritum* as general; *fronte petet* [16] seems too determined and active to be a mere indication of future nubility), or adds a pathetic irony to *petet maritum* (understanding Horace) since it will be too late, if not already so.

This view of the ambiguity of *maritum* can be held without difficulty reading *petet* (cf. Macleod in Woodman and West, *Creative Imitation*, 100), but if we read *petit* the equivocation becomes very clear (the future is not 'obviously necessary', as N.-H. put it ad loc., and a corruption towards uniformity seems more likely than one towards diversity). With the present tense the contrast between *te sequetur* (13) and *petit maritum* (16), pointed by the indication of time's passage that intervenes, makes it clear that the former is a hope and the latter a well prepared ambiguity ('she'll come after me - I'm getting old - she's already after a mate'). Of course with *petit* Lalage's immaturity becomes progressively less plausible through the poem, and Jocelyn's contrast between love and (future) nuisance (*LCM* 5.9 [Nov. 1980], 197-200), a question, as he says, of emphasis, will be seen either not to be present or to represent present mixed feelings. Elements from contrasts may be omitted (see *Odes* 2.3.9), but *proteruitas* in young women (as opposed to the *graus secutuleia*) is not always unacceptable, especially to love poets (cf. *Odes* 1.19.7 *Epp.* 1.7.28), nor is the quality inherent in *petere* (cf. *Odes* 1.33.13, 3.19.27, 4.11.21).

If we take *maritum* (16) as 1) implying Horace, we agree to be convinced by the assertion that Lalage's affections will turn in his favour, but remain in doubt as to whether he will live long enough to reciprocate when the time comes (*petet*) or whether he will be able to enjoy the reciprocation for any length of time (*petit*). This, in either case, is an ironic reversal of the statements made at the beginning of the poem. Taking *maritum* this way, *dilecta* (17, the girl loved more than other loves) adds to the pathos of Horace's dubious chances of being able to enjoy mutual relations with his best beloved, even with her willing.

If, however, we take the opportunity of understanding *maritum* as 2) general, and distinct from Horace (note the attractive balanced contrast of *iam tibi* [10], *iam te* [13], *iam [alium]* [15], and within the stanza of *te* [13] *illi* [14] *tibi* [14] *[alium]* [16]), we face the speaker's realization that Lalage is not for him. In this case *dilecta* ... provides the pathos of Horace's being jilted by his best beloved, the one he was jealous enough of to concern himself with her destination as well as the simple fact of her loss (jealousy is absent from the language used for Pholoe, Chloris and Gyges).

Whichever emphasis we give to *maritum*, the claim involved in *dilecta quantum non ...* (17), that Horace loved Lalage better than he did Pholoe, Chloris and Gyges, is much less extravagant and arrogant than those of Catullus (similarly worded) in 8.5 (*amata nobis quantum amabitur nulla*; cf. 37.12) and 72.3 (*dilexi tum te non tantum ut uolguis amicum*). Lesbia is unique, but there is a subtlety in Horace that, to the extent that Lalage and Pholoe are not strongly distinguished, acknowledges the vital importance of small personal differences in questions of love.

Lalage, in fact, is neither fully distinguished from, nor fully assimilated to, Pholoe, Chloris and Gyges. This is a question of some importance, as one third of *Odes* 2.5 is taken up with what seems to be a detachable pendant describing three characters whose presence is not previously hinted at.

Lalage is named very late in the poem: so late that the four names almost form a single group (they are confined to the space of five lines, 16-20). Furthermore the type indications of the names are homogenous and the purely verbal significances of the names do not make the expected contrast between Lalage and the others. What seems to be indicated after a first reading is a contrast between the natural, animal Lalage and the refined, civilized Pholoe, Chloris and Gyges: Lalage is described in terms of nature, but the purely verbal significance of Pholoe (an Arcadian mountain) is not inconsistent with this. In fact, the name Lalage ('chatterer') is less suited to the natural world than either Pholoe or Chloris ('leaf yellow').

Furthermore, although there is a verbal contrast between *petit Lalage* (16) and *Pholoe fugax* (17), the quality ascribed to Lalage (*proteruitas* 15) is not incompatible with *fugax* (cf. esp. *Epp.* 1.7.28 *fugam Cinaræ ... proteruae*, and note Ovid's advice at *AA* 3.579ff. and Horace's at *Odes* 1.9.21-22, on the girl who wants to be caught). Both qualities are compatible with the natural/Arcadian world and the world of the courtesan (Lalage's *proteruitas*: for flightiness in animals cf. *Odes* 1.23: *fugax* in Arcadia, cf. Statius, *Silu.* 2.3.8-10, of Pholoe fleeing Pan: see N.-H. on *Odes* 1.33.7). If Lalage is *immitis* (10) she is again comparable with Pholoe, since girls with the latter name in poetry are almost universally harsh (cf. *Odes* 1.33.6-7 *asperam*; Tibullus 1.8; note *fugax* in the present context), and the mountain from which they take their name also has this character (Lucan 6.388).

If Pholoe is less obviously animal than Lalage, the progression towards sophistication and civilization is carried further with Chloris. Again the name is more natural than Lalage's, and nature is present in her description (*luna ... mari* [20]), but *albo* (18) suggests whiteness of skin (an asset, relatively unnatural, in such women: note the name Chione in Martial: see Howell

at 1.34.7 and cf. esp. 3.34; cf. also Juvenal 3.136 and *Sat.* 1.2.124: Chloris is set off by the juxtaposition with the adjective, and contrasts with Lalage, a darkening grape [10-12]), or make-up (chalk: *album* sometime used for chalk; cf. Juvenal 1.111 *pedibus albis*; for chalk used as make-up see *Epod.* 12.10, *Sat.* 1.2.124 [implicit], Ovid, *AA* 3.199). *unero* (18), prominent as its mention is, suggest a shoulder left bare by Roman fashion (cf. Ovid, *AA* 3.307-10, a fashion particularly effective in white-skinned women: the suggestion of sophistication is still capable of use - Evyan Perfumes Inc. advertise 'A classic couple ... : *White Shoulders* for her ... *The Baron* for him'). The nature imagery in Chloris' description is itself used to suggest the civilized world: *pura ... luna* (19-20) suggests remote beauty and also, perhaps, something like the association of Cynthia and the moon in Propertius 1.3 (see O'Neill, *CP* 53[1958], 1-3); *renidet mari* (19-20) suggests reflection or illusion, *mari* the fickleness of the sea and the courtesan (cf. *Odes* 1.5), and the whole phrase (with a possible pun on *Mari*) suggests Endymion. The recondite allusion (cf. Theocritus 3.49-50, *AP* 5.123, Σ Apollonius Rhodius 4.57, Catullus 66.5-6, Ovid, *Her.* 18.59ff., *AA* 3.83-4, Juvenal 10.318 + Σ, and the title of one of Varro's *Menippeans*) adds to the sophisticated impression.

Gyges in name (suggesting Lydian opulence and refinement), description (Cnidian *puer delicatus* in a social context; on *choro* [21] see N.-H. at *Odes* 2.20) and gender is the culmination of the progress towards civilization and Alexandrian sophistication (cf. *sagaces* [22]). At the same time another graduation has been taking place: personal characteristics become dissipated as the list proceeds. There is a change from Lalage's animal vitality to Pholoe's flightiness (not too great a change: cf. the flighty animal-girl in *Odes* 1.23 and *fugax* as used of animals), which is furthered by Chloris' air of remove (*pura luna* [19-20]) and illusion (*renidet mari* [19-20]), and most of all with Gyges' total lack of distinguishing characteristics (*discrimen obscurum* [23], *ambiguoque vultu* [24]).

Lesbia is unique. Lalage is both unique and comparable with her peers. To the extent that she is contrasted with the others as a group she appears vital and animal and thus conforms to the *topos* lying behind *Sat.* 1.2.78ff. (see also *AP* 5.18, preferring slave girl to luxurious lady, = Rufinus V in Page, *The epigrams of Rufinus*, Cambridge 1978, where see his commentary); she also contrasts with the aging Horace and there is a pathos here. To the extent that she is only one of a group of four, the slight graduation from each to each suggests the variety and the similarity of human types. Thus, with so little distinction between each and the next, the precariousness of any choice is marked, and the unhappy outcome of Horace's particular choice of Lalage is all the more ironic (the humorous possibilities of this tension between variety and similarity, and the difficulty of choice, are used by Ovid in *Am.* 2.10, esp. 7-8; cf. Serlo of Wilton's poem in *bivio ponor*, text in Dronke, *Mediaeval Latin and the rise of the European Love-Lyric*², Cambridge 1968, p.493).

There is also external evidence bearing on the question whether *maritum* (16) refers to Horace or to another man.

The situation of the older man replaced by a younger is common (as expected: cf. Anacreon 358P., *Odes* 1.33.3-4, 3.6.25), as is the loss of love in old age (Mimnermus 1, Theognis 457-460, *AP* 11.19 & 62, *Odes* 1.9.15ff.; cf. also the *geron astutos*). The situation of Horace himself being replaced by a younger man occurs in *Odes* 1.5 and 13, and (probably) also in 3.9. Similar is *Odes* 4.11, where Phyllis is interested in another man, but cannot have him and is invited to make do with the aging Horace, who will never love again (for other love triangles cf. *Odes* 1.17, 3.10 and 1.33 [which includes three such triangles]: in all cases of the figure in Horace, except in two of the three in 1.33, Horace is in one of the corners). Of special note, because of its place in the collection, is *Odes* 2.4, where Horace, at over forty, shows a suspicious interest in Xanthias' girlfriend, and pleads his age as evidence against the suspicions. *Odes* 2.4 is simple and humorous (see Gillies, *CQ* 30[1980], 540): *Odes* 2.5 is varied in mood, and essentially a more serious version of the same theme (note how two poems referring to Horace's age are followed by *Odes* 2.6, which looks to his death, however lacking in seriousness that look may be).

That the poem should not lead towards the desired satisfaction might also be suggested by consideration of sources. Anacreon 417P., addressed to a Thracian filly, is an entreaty not granted in the fragment as extant (it seems to be complete). The girl's maturity is not clearly indicated: *λοξόν θυμῷ* (1) might imply contempt (perhaps strengthened by *νηλέως* [2]), and *δοκέει δέ* (2) suggests that the girl has some basis for distinction: what she lacks is not an *ἐπειβάτην* (6), but a skillful one. For what it is worth the girl seemed to Heraclitus (*Quaest. Hom.* 5) to have an *ἐταιρικὸν φρόνημα καὶ σοβαρὰς γυναικὸς ὑπερηφανίαν*.

Further more it seems that we have an intermediary between Anacreon and Horace where this is again the case. Lucilius 1041-2M. (= 1041-2W., 985-6K.) is an address to a girl who is compared to a Thracian filly:

ante ego te vacuam atque animosam

Tessalam ut indomitam frenis subigamque domemque.

The fragment which follows in all three editions appears to belong in proximity and to give the girl's answer

tunc iugo iungas me autem et succedere aratro

inuitam et glebam subigas proscindere ferro?

The girl resists Lucilius and adds to his Anacreontic horse image the image of the *iuuenca* taken up by Horace.

Horace *Odes* 2.5 is, thus, a mimetic expression of hope, which moves through impetuosity combined with idealism, restraint, confidence and uncertainty (a naturalistic sequence which echoes that of many a relationship): the hope is equivocal and unsure (as appears in the age calculation and the ambiguity of *maritum*), and other interpretations suggesting jealousy and self-deception are possible. Essentially the poem is about some of the ironies of love: differences in personalities which appear large or small in different perspectives, and with the most sad irony noted by Auden in *Sonnets from China*, 1:

[Man] who looked for truth and was always mistaken,

... , and chose his love.

The Horatian poem is executed with skill and great variety of mood; it encapsulates a wide range of human attributes, from animal and vital to over-refined and decadent, from young to old, and is very far from the inhumanity censured by Nisbet and Hubbard (p.80)

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C.J. ROWE (Bristol): de Aristotelis in tribus libris Ethicorum dicendi ratione: *particles, connectives and style in three books from the Aristotelian ethical treatises. PART II.* continued from LCM 8.1 (Jan. 1983), 4-11.

The Editor regrets the need to preface this, the second but not the last instalment of the paper, with an extensive list of CORRIGENDA, and craves the indulgence of author and readers, to both of whom he extends his apologies, but with no great hopes that the third instalment will not be similarly prefaced.

p.4 The first sentence should read:

This paper represents an attempt to discover the extent to which the study of particles and connectives, of the kind made by Anthony Kenny in chapter 4 of *The Aristotelian Ethics* (apparently a deleted mis-typing was not replaced)

p.6 l.e should read οὐ μὴ μόνον ἀλλὰ (καί)

n.12 line 7 should begin has evidently slipped out of Susemihl's text),

11, end of paragraph, the reference should be (once in EE III).

p.9 4. γε last line but one of the section delete the intrusive ο at the beginning of the line and at the end read account for not from

n.24 The figures for ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδέ should read 0 / 1 / 0;

p.10 n.31 The reference in the last line should be to EE III 1232a2

n.34 The reference in line 4 should be to n.14 not to n.15

p.11 line 3 The reference should be to AE A not AE E

end of line 9 The gap before in the apodosis should be filled with ἄν

n.44 The reference in line 2 should be to n.36 not to n.37

and in the penultimate line to EE 7 not to EE 8 (& is on the same key as 7!)

To sum up the story so far: Kenny's gross counts for the three sample books made ἀλλὰ, γάρ, γε, δέ, εἰ, ἐπεὶ, καί, οἷ, οὐ, οὐδέ and ὥστε significantly irregular in frequency. Breaking down these and other items in the complete list use by use, we found irregularity located in particular uses of ἀλλὰ, γάρ, γε, δέ, εἰ, ἐπεὶ, καί and ὥστε; irregularities in both uses of ἤ; and regularities in both uses of οἷ and οὐδέ respectively. In addition, we found special considerations affecting the use to be made of counts for δῆ, μὴ, οὐ, οὐδέ and οὐτε. I now want to ask whether all or any of the irregularities which remain can straightforwardly be interpreted in terms of stylistic differences. What is at issue here is a further objection to Kenny's methods, which he himself partially anticipates. One of the advantages for the stylometrist of the chosen group of items is, he says, that their frequency 'is not affected by variations in subject matter as the frequency of most nouns, verbs and adjectives is'⁴⁵. He admits, at the same time, that their topic-neutrality is only comparative. We shall see, however, that with some of his items subject-matter is a rather more important factor in determining incidence that he appears to suggest; important enough, in fact, in some cases, to account for irregularities (within the sample books) by itself.

We may begin with ἀλλὰ. We have seen that the use of ἀλλὰ, and specifically the use of ἀλλὰ simple, is irregular in the three sample books⁴⁶. Although AE A is closer here to EE III than to NE IV, the difference between the latter two is rather less than that between either of them and AE A. It is plausible to account for this state of affairs in the following way. By far the most common uses of ἀλλὰ simple in all three books is after a negative, whether actual or implied: 'not A / but B' (compare the less common pattern 'B / but (and) not A')⁴⁷. We may reasonably suppose that the need for this type of pattern will increase the more argumentative a context is; and we shall later find other support for identifying a difference in just these terms between AE A and the other two books. If so, we have at least an hypothetical explanation of the higher incidence of ἀλλὰ in AE A - and that explanation will ultimately relate to the subject-matter of the book, since as I shall argue it is subject-matter, not 'style' in any sense, that accounts for its greater argumentativeness. No other feature of the distribution of ἀλλὰ simple in the three books requires explanation⁴⁸; the difference between NE IV and EE III is certainly small enough to be put down to mere chance⁴⁹.

45. Anthony Kenny, *The Aristotelian Ethics*, Oxford 1978, pp.70-71.

46. LCM 8.1 (Jan. 1983), 9 & nn.23 & 24.

47. Of the examples of ἀλλὰ simple, 32 (or 33, depending on the treatment of the first use in 1121a30) out of 34 in NE IV, 60 out of 80 in AE A, and 33 out of 41 in EE III follow a negative.

48. But see below

49. Outside the sample books, however, Kenny's figures show both AE and EE as generally having a

The next item to be considered in this context, $\epsilon\iota$, offers perhaps rather firmer ground. As we saw⁵⁰, NE IV is out of step with the other two books specifically with respect to the incidence of $\epsilon\iota$ in conditionals. There are two chief causes of this: 1) AE A and EE III both show a relatively greater (though by the usual measure not significantly greater) liking for $\epsilon\iota$ with present indicative (other than where a deduction is being made); 2) AE A shows a particular liking for $\epsilon\iota$ with aorist indicative (= if x happened)⁵¹. The latter feature of AE A is accounted for by the legalistic or semi-legalistic aspect of much of the discussion in the book, which involves especially the retrospective consideration of cases. If we subtract these 11 cases from the total for $\epsilon\iota$ in conditionals in AE A, the figures for all three books become regular; though we may still wish to notice the other difference (in the incidence of $\epsilon\iota$ with present indicative), since the pattern of incidence here is sufficiently uneven to become irregular if repeated over a larger number of books. This might well turn out to be a stylistic difference, although as it happens NE IV does not appear to show a corresponding liking for any of the alternative constructions available, i.e. (especially) $\epsilon\delta\upsilon$ ($\delta\upsilon$) with subjunctive, genitive absolute, $\epsilon\iota$ with optative, and, on certain occasions, $\delta\tau\omicron\upsilon$ with subjunctive.

Thirdly, η ⁵². The relatively high incidence of comparative η in NE IV and EE III is accounted for by phrases like $\mu\alpha\lambda\lambda\omicron\nu/\eta\tau\tau\omicron\nu$ η $\delta\epsilon\tau$, the frequency of which increases in direct proportion to the number of virtues and vices discussed. Again, disjunctive η is more common in AE A than in NE IV and EE III because the discussion there revolves around pairs or groups of oppositions in a way it does not in the other books: either just or unjust, either voluntary or involuntary, and so on. But within AE A itself, certain parts also contain a strikingly larger number of examples of disjunctive η than others: there are, for instance, more than twice as many examples in the second four Bekker pages than in the first four. It is in fact a feature of a large number of Kenny's items that they have this tendency to bunch in particular contexts. Another example is in AE A: 1135a17 - b13, a passage representing roughly one-twentieth of the total words in the book, contains 6 $\omicron\upsilon\tau\epsilon$ s and 7 $\mu\eta\tau\epsilon$ s, i.e. roughly two-fifths of the total incidence of $\omicron\upsilon\tau\epsilon/\mu\eta\tau\epsilon$ in AE A (the passage more or less coincides with the highest incidence of disjunctive η - not surprisingly, since $\omicron\upsilon\tau\epsilon/\mu\eta\tau\epsilon$... $\omicron\upsilon\tau\epsilon/\mu\eta\tau\epsilon$ will function as the negative equivalent of η ... η ...). Such bunching, I suggest, is always liable to indicate a close relationship between the occurrence of a word and the topic being discussed. The effect of contexts of this kind, favouring a particular word (in a particular use), is often a significant increase in the total for the word/use in the whole book; and unless we are aware of the danger, we will begin to read what is really a high incidence of item x in a particular part of a book as a high incidence of x in that book as a whole (which is then with apparent plausibility read as a difference relating to style).

Two further items, $\mu\eta$ and $\omega\varsigma$. 1) $\mu\eta$: because of the general consideration outlined earlier⁵³, I have not attempted any breakdown of the uses of $\mu\eta$. We should, however, bear in mind the special generic use, which might plausibly be supposed to account for the relatively high incidence of $\mu\eta$ in NE IV and III, by comparison with other NE books, those two books being especially about types of behaviour (unfortunately, however, the pattern of distribution in EE will not allow the argument to go through quite so straightforwardly). 2) $\omega\varsigma$: the figures for $\omega\varsigma$, distributed as I have suggested above⁵⁴, show only unimportant differences⁵⁵. But the totals are made up in rather different ways: so under the first use NE IV has 22 occurrences and EE III 6 occurrences of $\omega\varsigma$ in formulae like $\omega\varsigma$ $\delta\epsilon\tau$, $\omega\varsigma$ δ $\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\varsigma$, etc., which play a crucial role in their discussions of the different virtues: AE A, on the other hand, has none, perhaps because a fair part of it consists of detailed discussion of exactly how one should behave in order to be just, so that it has less need for the general formula. Again, AE A has 5 examples, against none in the other two books, of the pattern ' a is to b $\omega\varsigma$ c is to d ', which is more obviously adapted to a treatment of justice than to that of other virtues.

Another feature of the same proportions (and one that further illustrates the point about 'bunching' made above) is the occurrence of 5 examples of causal $\omega\varsigma$ with participle, in the sense of 'on the grounds that x , as y supposes, is the case', in the discussion of $\mu\epsilon\gamma\alpha\lambda\omicron\mu\eta\chi\iota\alpha$ in NE IV, which is particularly concerned with the attitude of mind of the agent. The use appears once only in AE A, not at all in EE III, and only three times in the rest of NE IV (Here, though, one might well ask just why the use does not appear in EE III, which also discusses $\mu\epsilon\gamma\alpha\lambda\omicron\mu\eta\chi\iota\alpha$. Clearly, the EE III treatment of the virtue is different; and the difference might have to be treated as in some sense stylistic. Nevertheless, we may still argue that subject-matter accounts for the

noticeably higher incidence of $\delta\alpha\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}$ than NE. Nothing I say about $\delta\alpha\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}$, here or elsewhere, will help to explain this fact; indeed, it may well undermine the argument just mounted. It still remains true that nothing much can be based on $\delta\alpha\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}$ as it appears in the sample books; but it is clearly one item among others which require further investigation.

50. LCM 8.1(Jan.1983), 10 & n.31.

51. Figures given in n.31 cited in the previous note.

52. LCM 8.1(Jan.1983), 10 & n.33.

53. LCM 8.1(Jan.1983), 11 & nn.43 (which refers back to n.36 on p.10) & 44.

54. LCM 8.1(Jan.1983), 8.

55. a. = 28 / 20 / 14; b. = 11 / 2 / 0; c. = 1 / 5 / 3; d. = 0 / 3 / 0; e. = 2 / 0 / 1; f. = 1 / 0 / 0 (add one doubtful case in NE IV, for which see LCM 8.1(Jan.1983), p.8 n.12.

difference between NE IV and AE A, as distinct from that between NE IV and EE III, in so far as the treatment of μεγαλοψυχία offers an opportunity for the deployment of the relevant use of ὥς which the treatment of justice may not.)⁵⁶ We may say, then, that if the distribution of ὥς in its different uses is relatively even in the three books, this is not so much because of the uniformity of Aristotle's usage (though the data are plainly consistent with such uniformity), but because the differing demands of the subject-matter in different contexts either tend to cancel each other out, or produce relatively insignificant additions to the overall totals. But if we were given a different mix in the bag of contexts, it is easy to see that the overall totals could be disturbed. Once again, regularity or irregularity of usage cannot be deduced directly from regularity or irregularity of occurrences, even broken down by use.

A third line of objection to Kenny's methods is an extension of the last. The subject-matter of AE differs both from that of NE (with the small exception of the treatment of pleasure)⁵⁷ and from that of EE; the subjects treated by NE and EE, on the other hand, overlap considerably. I argued earlier, with respect to the sample books, that this state of affairs would have the advantage of rendering coincidences in word-usage between AE and EE or NE more significant⁵⁸. But there is also a problem here. It is clear that there are real differences in style and approach between NE and EE. These are illustrated by the contrasting treatments of μεγαλοψυχία just referred to: EE is both here and elsewhere sparer and more schematic than NE⁵⁹, and this is likely to be reflected in its general pattern of use of particles and connectives. Now if AE resembles EE more than it does NE in the way it uses particular items, that may be because it shares the stylistic characteristics of EE; but it may also be because the subject-matter of its three books has effects which coincidentally resemble the effects of style in the case of EE.

We may illustrate this possibility for the sample books in respect of one item, connective καί. The total figures for connective καί (NE IV: 302; AE A: 216; EE III: 181) can be divided up as follows: καί connecting 'sentences'⁶⁰, main clauses, or main verbs, NE IV: 66; AE A: 39; EE III: 20; καί connective, other, NE IV: 236; AE A: 177; EE III: 161. Any reading of NE IV will confirm both that it is more descriptive, i.e. contains more descriptive detail, than either of the other two books, and that καί connecting sentences, main verbs and main clauses occurs there especially in contexts with a high descriptive content (as we might expect in any case). The proportionately higher incidence of καί in this function may therefore, I suggest, itself be interpreted as a crude measure of the greater descriptiveness of NE IV.

Three other items need to be brought into play here: οὐδέ, τε and connective δέ. It is noticeable that only NE IV begins sentences with οὐδέ as connective (7 times): since οὐδέ in this case functions as the negative equivalent of connective καί, the figure should presumably be added to that for καί in the same position⁶¹. τε I include only for the sake of completeness; it occurs only once linking sentences (in NE IV), and twice (once in NE IV, once in AEA) linking main clauses. Connective δέ is rather more important; it is in fact in all three books Aristotle's standard means of adding one sentence or main clause to another. Here, on my count, the figures are less striking⁶², though in so far as they slightly favour NE IV, they tend to support the interpretation of the figures for καί/οὐδέ. But καί is perhaps particularly adapted to descriptive contexts: it is the natural link in collocations of simple main verbs; and it is observable that in NE IV καί/οὐδέ substitute for δέ οὐ + δέ especially where description takes the form of a simple listing of features.

But if its use of καί/οὐδέ does serve to distinguish NE IV from both of the other books, the point cannot be brought to bear immediately on the problems of AE. Whereas the lesser degree of descriptiveness discovered in EE III accords with the generally sparer nature of EE in comparison with NE, could we not reasonably say that the same feature in AE A again rather reflects the differing demands of a treatment of justice? Two objections: firstly, it will be difficult, perhaps, to set a general limit to the possible ways in which justice might be treated; secondly, and more specifically, the chief element in the more schematic approach of EE to the individual virtues, its stress on the establishment of the applicability of the schema of means and extremes, may also

56. It would, admittedly, be a pretty weak argument; but I shall presently mount a similar argument in respect of a different item which may have a rather stronger base.

57. NE and AE do also both discuss the voluntary and involuntary (as of course does EE). But their discussions of it are not really parallel; and the argument will be about content rather than about style (see Kenny's second book, *Aristotle's Theory of the Will*, Oxford 1979, with my review, forthcoming in *JHS*).

58. *LCM* 8.1 (Jan. 1983), 6.

59. See my monograph, *The Eudæmian and Nicomachean Ethics: A Study in the Development of Aristotle's Thought*, Cambridge 1971 (= *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society*, Supplement 3), passim.

60. By 'sentences', I propose to mean any unit bounded in the editors' texts either by full stops or colons, or by a combination of both (with the proviso that Susemihl's text of EE occasionally uses colons to mark off long subordinate clauses from corresponding main clauses).

61. Compare also the patterns οὐ ... δ'οὐδέ ... and οὐδέ ... δέ (for which see p. below)

62. Totals in n.28 above (*LCM* 8.1 [Jan. 1983], 9 (with a qualification added)).

63.

40 be detected in the AE A treatment of justice. But these objections can be met. We may reply to the second that the applicability of the schema to the case of justice is a special problem; and in fact Aristotle explicitly marks it as such in NE II, 1108b7-9. To the first objection, the reply is that it would at least not be easy to reconstruct a more descriptive version of the discussion of justice corresponding to, say, the discussion of μεγαλοψυχία in NE IV. Justice is simply a more difficult case, requiring hard analysis rather than description: the term δικαιοσύνη is ambiguous; at least one rival account of it is in the air; and there are also a number of special problems connected with justice arising out of contemporary debate the discussion of which is by no means out of character with what we find generally in NE⁶³.

We are now left with four cases of significant irregularity in the sample books: γάρ, adversative δέ, ἐπεὶ = 'since', 'if', and connective ὥστε. In each of these cases, AE A resembles EE III more closely than it does NE IV; and in each we may plausibly suppose that we are dealing with stylistic differences, at least in so far as no other factor appears as operating to cause the irregularity. Even of these, however, one may not be useful for the problem of AE. This is the case of adversative δέ, where AE A is only very marginally closer to EE III; the real difference is between NE IV and EE III⁶⁴.

We may give a partial diagnosis of the latter difference. In what I have called the more schematic treatment of the virtues and vices in EE III, the linking device ... μέν ... δέ (... δέ ...) predominates. NE IV, on the other hand, by the inclusion of more descriptive detail, draws out its contrasting accounts of the virtues and vices to a length which makes the deployment of ... μέν ... δέ ... more difficult. But that in turn leads to a readily observable increase in the incidence of simple adversative δέ. We might argue, I suppose, that its frequency in NE IV was therefore abnormal; if that in AE A is (relatively) close to it, that might be because of the operation of the same sorts of causes as lead to an increase there in the use of ἀλλά, for which it often substitutes. We would thus have some sort of argument for supposing an underlying uniformity in the use of simple adversative δέ in AE A and EE III. But as my diagnosis of the difference between NE IV and EE III suggests, and as is in any case obvious, the figures for simple adversative δέ should be read closely with those for δέ in ... μέν ... δέ If we do read the figures this way, there is no significant irregularity.

We may concentrate, then, on γάρ, ἐπεὶ = 'since', 'if', and connective ὥστε. In these cases there is no detectable influence from subject-matter; and there is a significant difference between NE IV, on the one hand, and AE A and EE III on the other. In other words, NE IV has significantly more 'sentences' with γάρ as connective⁶⁵; while AE A and EE III are significantly more likely to introduce causal clauses with ἐπεὶ and to begin 'sentences' with ὥστε. What is more, Kenny's total figures for γάρ, ἐπεὶ and ὥστε in all books of NE, AE and EE seem to allow us to extend the argument directly to the three groups of books as wholes, providing only that the incidence of the other uses of ἐπεὶ and ὥστε is a negligible in the books not tested as it is in the sample books⁶⁶. It looks therefore as if these three items at least (out of his original list of twenty-four) may provide support for his preferred solution to the problem of AE.

At this point, however, I shall in effect go back to the beginning, and suggest a method of studying the usage of particles and connectives which is perhaps more refined than Kenny's, and this will appear in the next instalment of this paper.

63. If I have not so far considered the differences between the other figures for connective καί (see p.39 above), this is because I have little that is useful to say about them. But we may notice that while these figures show AE A to be (proportionately) closer to EE III than to NE IV, EE III is itself closer to NE IV than it is to AE A. Since the major known connexion between NE IV and EE III is in their subject-matter; since καί is far and away the commonest single word in all three books; and since the totals for καί currently at issue are by far the largest components of those totals, it is an hypothesis worth considering that similarity of subject-matter is at least part of what brings the relevant totals in NE IV and EE III close together. If so, it is again difficult to know exactly what we should make of the other relative similarity, i.e. between EE III and AE A.

64. But note again the uncertainty attaching to all my figures for δέ (LCM 8.1[Jan.1983], 9, n.28).

65. I put this in a deliberately ambiguous way: it will be made clearer later.

66. The same proviso ought in principle to be made for γάρ, in so far as I have up to now separated γάρ simple from καί γάρ. But this too will be discussed below.

Review: A.J. WOODMAN (Leeds):

LCM 8.3 (Mar. 1983), 41-43 41

C.O. Brink, *Horace on Poetry* [Vol. 3]: *Epistles Book II*, Cambridge University Press 1982.
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It is a depressingly familiar experience, when one is confronted by some puzzle in reading an ancient author, to consult the standard commentary, if such exists, only to discover that the commentator seems to have been commenting on a different author altogether. Either he does not say anything at all, or he tells you what you already know, or what you have no wish to know. Yet in some ways this circumstance is to be expected. Many of the texts we read are works of art, exhibiting many different aspects. The limitations of human ability and the economics of modern publishing alike determine that not every aspect of every passage will be discussed. It is all very well to complain that one of the 'occupational diseases of commentators' is providing 'nests of references to other commentators' (J. Griffin, *JRS* 70 [1980], 183); but had the author of that complaint been a commentator himself, he might perhaps have realized that it is pointless and expensive to repeat information which is readily available elsewhere and that by providing a set of alternative references the commentator, so far from trying to contaminate his readers by exposing them to viperous poison, is in fact endeavouring to combine helpfulness with economy.

Again, our responses to a text are in some respects individual, and the impressions we derive, and the questions we want answered, are not necessarily those which presented themselves to the commentator. I invariably find, for example, that what I want to know about Thucydides and Cicero's letters is not what Gomme and Shackleton Bailey respectively have decided to tell me. And again, many scholars see themselves as specialists in either history, literature, archaeology or whatever, and this is liable to determine the nature of their annotations. An otherwise very helpful commentary on a Roman historical author was recently published, in which, as far as I can see, there is no linguistic or stylistic comment at all; the commentator, an historian, seems to have assumed that the author's text, meaning and manner of expression are either unworthy of comment or self-evident. And yet again, some commentators allow their approach to be influenced by what they see as the philosophy of their subject. If I may be permitted to use myself as an example, I believe that ancient historians were principally literary men, and that one's response to their texts should be correspondingly literary: hence in my commentary on Velleius, while I have tried to ascertain what he wrote or at least to indicate what he did not write (thereby alerting readers as to what may be regarded as 'evidence'), I have devoted my remarks principally to literary matters - something which I stated in the preface to my first volume but which did not prevent some historical reviewers from taking no notice of it.

Few works present as much challenge to the reader and would-be commentator as those of Horace. Quite apart from the fact that he wrote poetry, with all that that implies, he also displays a diverse personality which yet remains recognizably Horatian; his text appears seductively settled; his career began during a revolution and ended during a dictatorship; and his argument never fails to be tantalizingly subtle and maddeningly elusive. It is twenty years since C.O. Brink published the first volume of *Horace on Poetry*; the second volume, the commentary on the *Ars Poetica*, appeared in 1971; and now we have the third and final volume, consisting of commentary on *Epistulae* 2.1 and 2. It will already be clear, especially to readers of vol. 2, that almost none of my introductory remarks is applicable to Professor Brink and his work. As epigraph to that volume he chose the lines of Edward Young: 'How commentators each dark passage shun | and hold their farthing candle to the sun'. Whether the quotation represented a disarming apology, or whether it described a convention which needed urgent exploding, other users of that volume will no doubt have been as exasperated as me to have found that it consistently shatters their preconceptions about commentators. In reading vol. 2 it is as rare not to be told what one wants to know as it is common to find that one's own bright ideas had not only already occurred to Professor Brink but been treated by him to detailed and judicious discussion. Readers of that volume will not be surprised to learn that the same is true of the present volume.

But there is more to Professor Brink's work than this. We know that his intimate familiarity with Horatian poetry enables him to offer the judicious advice that much of Horace's verse should be read backwards as well as forwards (vol. 2, p. 105). We know that he, like the Corpus Professor at Oxford (cf. e.g. *Phoenix* 36 [1982], 181), is sceptical of the reliability of current texts of Horace. But surveying his work from the perspective of this latest volume, and reading the statements it contains, I think it is fair to say that Professor Brink has endeavoured to produce 'the ultimate commentary'. In other words, his work is not merely the excellent exegesis of Horace's literary epistles that we would expect; it is at the same time a demonstration of method. Brink is telling us that this is how commentaries should be written.

Naturally Brink is far too modest to say this in so many words. He opens the present volume by saying merely that his task has been to take 'some major pieces of Latin poetry as far as they will go' (ix). The task involves 'seeking to establish the text, but also vocabulary, diction, level of style, mode of composition, and, finally, the meaning, or meanings, so imposed on the subject'. No doubt many commentators have such ideals vaguely unexpressed at the back of their minds, but Brink points out that the task has not been 'carried out before in the same manner not even in such unmatched masterpieces as Bentley's *Horace* and Housman's *Manilius*, Wilamowitz's *Heraclitus*, Norden's *Aeneid* VI, and Fraenkel's *Agamemnon*, although, in other vital respects, they mark standards of attainment at which we can only aim' (ix).

Brink discusses his task in an introductory section entitled 'Some Thoughts on "Philology" and "Method" by way of Preface' (ix-xiv). He sees five areas of activity, of which the first is textual. He rightly remarks that editors, having established their text, should also explain it in the commentary: for he contends, not without reason, that 'few editors understand what they print, unless they come to make explicit the meaning of what they print'. And if editors fail so

to do, the poor reader can only be left in the state of *aporia* which I described in my opening paragraph. Coming as it does from one of the editors of the well known Cambridge series of 'orange' commentaries, Brink's principle is all the more welcome.

His second area is lexicography, on which he rightly notes that 'this kind of research is still in its early stages ... We have yet a long way to go before we can claim to understand Augustan style'. But since 'a word-by-word commentary can do much' to advance this research, he has 'devoted much time and space to it'. The time and space have been eminently worthwhile: Brink's lexicographical notes are among the most valuable in the commentary, some of them extending to take up several of the twenty-one appendices (e.g. 5 on *exactus* as a literary critical term).

The third area is 'the step from the line-by-line approach to the poem as a whole and its constituent parts'. While it is of course true that 'this is of primary importance in Augustan poetry', it is above all important in a poet of such logical subtlety as Horace. Here one of the inherent disadvantages of the traditional commentary-format emerges: it fragments the material which one wants to see as a whole (cf. p.x). Brink has tackled the problem in two ways: by inserting into the commentary proper some introductory remarks on Horace's paragraphs, and by including in the later part of the book extended essays on the structure, argument and diversity/unity of *Epist.* 2.1 and 2. Here he rightly calls attention (456) to the fact that he has paragraphed his text. This seems to me to be a practice of supreme importance which many editors commonly neglect. It is a miracle, for example, that anyone can understand Thucydides' preface from the way it is printed in every edition I have seen (and I suppose the melancholy fact is that many people do not understand it). Paragraphing Horace is of course exceptionally tricky, as Brink realizes only too well (p.463). Horatian sentences have the alarming habit of looking both forwards and backwards simultaneously, as Knoche demonstrated long ago and as Brink himself amply demonstrates here by his practice, repeated from vol.2, of analysing Horace's argument both progressively and retrospectively. Still, I would have welcomed some further remarks on the way in which Horace changes the direction of his argument, especially the asyndetic method employed at e.g. 2.1.5, 50 & 139.

With reference to 2.2, Brink discusses its central portion on *legitimum poema* (lines 109ff.) and mentions the work of Haffter, Hering and Collinge (pp.458-9 with n.1). Of course one man's structure is not always the next man's. Thus Hering has proposed an interesting, if complicated structure for *S.* 1.9, but seems not to have noticed that the 'law-suit motif', which will provide the dénouement of the drama, is introduced in the exact centre of the poem (36b-43a: 35½ lines both precede and follow). Brink is in fact sceptical of Hering's work, which he has reviewed critically in *Gnomon* 53(1981), 231-5, here mentioned; but poetic structures do abound in Augustan poetry, as further reference to the work of Moritz, Nadeau and Van Rooy on Horace alone might have indicated.

Brink's fourth area of activity concerns the background of literary theory which he has discussed principally in vol.1 and at the appropriate points in the two subsequent volumes. The fifth area concerns the conditions in which Horace wrote, a subject to which Brink has devoted a substantial chapter at the end of the book (pp.523-572). For him Horace is neither the propagandist which he is for Syme nor the genuine loyalist which he was for Fraenkel, nor yet the schizophrenic suggested by La Penna, for whom the true Horace is not to be found in the Roman odes. While Brink is closest to La Penna, he rightly remarks that not all the political poems are alike: 'literary tact and appropriate interpretations will differentiate between them' (525). Brink sees both Augustan politics and Augustan poetry as falling into two separate periods: the first ending about 19 B.C., the second ending with Horace's own death in 8 B.C.. Poetry of the first period is characterized especially by the 'new classical style' (530); the presence of Maecenas as the poet's patron interposed a buffer between practitioners and *princeps* (530-532), and just as the *Aeneid* is a remarkably ambiguous poem (531, 535), so Horace's poetry of this period is conspicuous for the politics which it omits rather than that which it includes (536ff.). 'The political element, important as it obviously is, has been isolated and magnified unduly' (538), a statement which leads Brink into comparing *Odes* 3.14 with Propertius 3.4 (a comparison which has also been undertaken by F.Cairns, *Generic Composition* [1972], 179ff., not mentioned by Brink). The whole discussion of the literature of this period is interesting by somewhat opaque, which I take to reflect the nature of the relationship which Brink sees between the poets and their political masters.

As for Horace's achievement in the period after 19 B.C., Brink does not detect a falling off in Horace's powers as a poet. 'What has happened was rather a shift of the conditions under which genuine poetry was now produced in Rome, and, more importantly, Horace's own reaction to this shift ... [There is] a falling off in the inspiration of the political pieces, but not in the personal lyrics or the hexameter poems with the possible exception of the *Augustus*' (550-551). One reason for this is the withdrawal of Maecenas and the consequently increased influence of the *princeps* himself (558-9); and Horace, the outstanding living poet, found himself 'the only great survivor of the first great period'.

Here, it seems to me, there was an opportunity to investigate the significance of Horace's choice of the epistolary form. Augustus was himself a prolific and humorous letter-writer (cf. Nepos, *Atticus* 20.2), and Suetonius (*Vita Horati*) quotes from his letters to Horace as manifestations of the former's *amicitia*. The first extract is an invitation, suggesting the kind of relationship he wants with Horace (*id usus mihi tecum esse uolui*) and expressing concern over Horace's health in much the same way as Horace is concerned about Augustus' own health in *Epist.* 1.13.3 (a letter which effectively 'dedicates' this part of Book 1 to Augustus, as Professor Kenney has suggested, *ICS* 2[1977], 239). The second extract betrays concern that Horace may reject Augustus' *amicitia*, and mentions *Septimius noster*, doubtless the same man as is addressed in *Odes* 2.6 and recommended to Tiberius in *Epist.* 1.9 as *fortem bonumque*, qualities which would appeal to

the man who himself is described as *bono claroque* in Horace's letter to Julius Florus (2.2.1), one of Tiberius' existing *comites*. After Augustus' familiar remarks about Horace's being *purissimum penem* and *homuncionem lepidissimum*, Suetonius quotes two final extracts: in the first, Augustus, having read *sermones quosdam*, complains that he is not mentioned therein by Horace; and in the second he reports that one Onysius, perhaps the same Vinnius Valens whom Horace nicknames Asina in *Epist.* 1.13, has delivered a book of Horace's poetry (what the book was is disputed: many scholars deny that *carmina* in line 17 can refer to anything other than the *Odes*; but Brink himself several times stresses that the word need not be so restricted [cf. e.g. 2.2.59-60n.], and certainly *S.* 2.1.63, for example, supports this view).

The pervasive tone of this correspondence, despite the reservations which Brink has about two of the Augustan extracts (552 n.1), seems to me to be sincerely jocular and to reveal a nexus of personal relationships between members of the imperial household and poets, including - naturally and principally - Horace. Is it, then, significant that Horace chose to respond to one of Augustus' letters by himself writing the letter which we know as *Epist.* 2.1? Admittedly Horace's letter is not of the jocular type that was so well recognized in antiquity (cf. Cicero, *Fam.* 2.4.1). Yet Horace does have the rare gift of being able to be amusing and serious at once (cf. Nisbet/Hubbard on *Odes* 1.34 intro., C.W. Macleod, *CQ* 27[1977], 360); the letter does contain elements of burlesque, as Brink points out (488-9); and Brink also detects a smile in the transition at lines 17/18 (pp. 58-9), an observation which might have been sharpened by noting the allusion to the so-called *du-Stil* in line 19. However, apart from pp. 32-3 and some incidental remarks elsewhere, Brink seems not to consider what quasi-political inferences may be drawn from Horace's choice of the epistolary genre.

Yet this is one of the very few items to have escaped Professor Brink's net, the capaciousness of which may well prompt other commentators to reflect on the amiability of his publisher in allowing him so much room. Not only has Brink been able to fulfil the ambitious programme which he set himself and which I outlined above, but he has done so at length and in style: together his three volumes amount to more than 1500 pages and employ to the full all the elegant resources of the Cambridge University Press. Indeed this may well prove to be the 'ultimate commentary' in more senses than one, for I cannot see that its scale and scope will be repeated in the conditions which are likely to apply to the publishing of classical commentaries in the future.

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SIMON HORNBLOWER (Oriel College, Oxford): *Alexander and τύχη: a note on Diodorus 17.38.4-5*

LCM 8.3 (Mar. 1983), 43

The text, which deals with Alexander's treatment of Darius III's captured womenfolk, runs as follows (as printed in Fischer's Teubner and Welles' Loeb; so too - at least on the point at issue - Wesseling and Dindorf of the older edd. and Goukowsky in the 1976 Budé):

καθόλου δ' ἔγωγε νομίζω πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν ἔργων ὑπ' Ἀλεξάνδρου συντετελεσμένων μηδὲν τούτων μεῖζον ὑπάρχειν μᾶλλον ἄξιον ἀναγραφῆς καὶ μνήμης ἱστορικῆς εἶναι. 5 αἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν πόλεων πολιορκίαι καὶ παρατάξεις καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον προτερήματα τὰ πλείονα διὰ τύχην ἢ δι' ἀρετὴν ἐπιτυχάνεται, ὁ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις εἰς τοὺς ἐπαικτότας ἔλεος μεριζόμενος διὰ μόνης τῆς φρονήσεως γίνεται.

The words I wish to discuss are αἱ μὲν γὰρ ... πολιορκίαι καὶ ... τὰ ἄλλα τὰ κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον προτερήματα τὰ πλείονα διὰ τύχην ἢ δι' ἀρετὴν They are translated in Welles' Loeb as follows: 'sieges and battles and the other victories scored in war are due for the most part either to Fortune or valour', while pity is 'an action due only to wisdom' (φρόνησις). Goukowsky's version is similar; see however below for Wesseling.

Can this be right? (the Plutarch parallels adduced by Welles do not match closely). I think not (for Welles' meaning, a first ἢ before διὰ τύχην would greatly help). If however we omit the τὰ after προτερήματα, which is palaeographically easy, we get τὰ κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον προτερήματα πλείονα διὰ τύχην ἢ δι' ἀρετὴν κ.τ.λ., and a different meaning emerges: 'sieges and battles and the other victories scored in war are generally due more to Fortune than to virtue, but when one in a position of power shows pity for those who have been overthrown, this is an action due only to wisdom'. In other words, I am suggesting that no real distinction is being made between ἀρετὴ and φρόνησις, but both are being contrasted with τύχη. This is plausible in the context because Diodorus sums up (§7) by saying, roughly, 'so let Alexander receive due praise for his δόξαι ἀρεταί'.

An alternative solution is to retain τὰ before πλείονα, but simply to translate it differently from Welles, so that τὰ πλείονα ἢ is taken to mean the same as πλείονα ἢ, i.e. as 'more ... than' rather than 'for the most part either ...'. So apparently Wesseling: *urbium enimvero expugnationes et secundi conflictus, quaeque alia prospere in bellis geruntur, ut plurimum fortunae potius benignitate, quam virtutis praestantia, homines adipiscuntur*. But even if τὰ πλείονα can be so translated, something I am not sure about, the sense 'more ... than' can more easily be extracted from πλείονα ἢ than from τὰ πλείονα ἢ, so I would prefer to emend.

To paraphrase Diodorus' meaning in this part of the chapter, 'success in war is usually a matter of mere τύχη rather than ἀρετὴ; but Alexander's behaviour on this occasion did in fact show real ἀρετὴ (manifested in an exhibition of φρόνησις and ἔλεος)'.

I am grateful to my colleague Robert Parker to whom several years ago I showed a draft of this note (which has slumbered since); the usual exemption clause applies. After my (as I though uncontroversial) note on *aqua haeret* in Cicero (*LCM* 5.5 [May 1980], 107), which generated more discussion than I could have dreamt of (as Professor Badian correctly surmised), I do not expect to get away with the present suggestion without challenge.

There is more one could say about this chapter of Diodorus, but I wish to keep this note short.

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Le oscillazioni della tradizione fra *στριφνός* e *στρυφνός* sono notorie: in *permutandis formis στριφνός, στριφνός, στρυφνός, στρυφνός, στρυφός, στρυφός, ita ludunt librarii, ut quid inter eas discriminis sit, vix ac ne vix quidem constituere posse* (D.Ruhnken, *Timaei Sophistae Lexicon vocum Platoniarum*², Lipsiae 1828 [cur. G.A.Koch], 198). Contro la dispettosa o ignara alterazione da parte dei copisti, soccorre tuttavia la semantica storica: distinguendo fra *στριφνός* = 'dense', 'serrée', 'dur', e *στρυφνός* = 'acerbe', 'astringent'¹. Una differenza sostanziale, che risulta talora oscurata nell'accezione tropica 'austero', 'severo', (caratterialmente) 'duro', usitatissima per il secondo termine: tra gli altri, già in Aristofane, *Vesp.* 877. Questa accezione, verosimilmente, permise la comunanza di alcuni *interpretamenta*² delle due forme: agevolandone la confusione nella lessicografia medievale³, nonché la derivazione della prima dalla seconda nella speculazione etimologica bizantina⁴.

Anche nel linguaggio del *Corpus* ippocratico, ferma restando l'inerenza alla sfera del gusto, che distintivamente e quasi costantemente caratterizza *στρυφνός*, non mancano passi ove il contesto ammetterebbe entrambi i termini, e fra essi la tradizione è motivatamente - incerta⁵. Fra i luoghi ippocratici in cui risulta immotivata l'incertezza della moderna lessicografia (cf. infra n.6), è indubbiamente *de morbo sacro* xiii 39J. (VI 380L.). Spiegando perché, negli individui di più di vent'anni, l'epilessia non incolga se non chi sia stato affetto già dall'infanzia, l'ippocratico autore rileva αὐτὸ γὰρ φλέβες αἵματος μεσθαὶ πολλοὺ εἶσιν, καὶ ὁ ἐγκέφαλος συνέστηκε καὶ ἐστὶ στρυφνός, ὥστε οὐκ ἐπικαταρρεῖ ἐπὶ τὰς φλέβας· ἢν δ' ἐπικαταρροῖ, τοῦ αἵματος οὐ κρατεῖ (xiii 37ss.). Trasmessa dalla maggioranza dei codd., ed accolta costantemente dagli editori, da Foes fino a Jones, la forma *στρυφνός* è meno convincente della *varia lectio στριφνός*⁶. Quest'ultima, di cui costante *interpretamentum* rimane *αριγνός*⁷ ('serrato', 'comparto'), si impone come unico per qualificare un cervello inattaccabile dall'epilessia. Una delle cause della malattia si deve infatti - secondo la fantasiosa eziologia del nostro autore - all'azione di venti che 'sciolgono' e

1. Cf. Chantraine, *DELG* 1064s., s.vv.. Mentre *στριφνός* è in rapporto con radici indoeuropee che significano 'sodo', 'duro', *στρυφνός* è imparentato con temi indoeuropei che valgono 'ispido', 'ruvido'. Oltre a Chantraine cit., si vedano Frisk, *GEW* II 810, 812s., nonché Pokorny, *IEW* I 1025s..
2. Cf. Photius 180N. = *Suda* σ 1023A. *στριφνός· αριγνός, στερεός* (~ *Etym.Sym.*, nonché *Etym.Magn.*, citt. infra n.4); Timaeus Soph., *Lex.Plat.* 198R². *στρυφνόν· στερεόν*.
3. Le glosse latino-greche del *Paris*.7651 (II 13.32f.G.) recano *aceruum* (v.l. *acerbum*): *δύρον, πυκνόν, ἀπέπειρον, στριφνόν*. Quelle greco-latine del *Laudun*.444 (II 438,616. *στριφνός: strigosus*).
4. Cf. *Etym.Sym.* (cod.Voss.gr.20, e rec. Gaisford) *στριφνός· ὁ αριγνός καὶ στερεός, παρὰ τὸ στίφω στύρος στρυφνός καὶ στιφνός καὶ στρυφνός, ὡς Ἀφροδίτη Ἀφροδίτη, δύρος δίφρος, τροπή τοῦ υ εἰς ι, καὶ πλεονασμῷ τοῦ ρ καὶ τοῦ ν. ~ Etym.Magn.730.23ss., nonché Eustathius 413.5ss. & 1913.15ss..*
5. Ad esempio, in *de acre, aquis, locis* 58.30s.H. (II 22L.), ove gli editori moderni stampano la *lectio difficilior* *στεριφναί*, le varianti *στρυφναί* e *στριφναί*, tra le quali oscillavano ancora le edizioni ottocentesche, sarebbero entrambe ammissibili. Già il Foes - che pure nella sua *Oeconomia Hippocratica* (Francofurti 1588, p.192) aveva mostrato di non allontanarsi molto dai lessicografi medievali nel fraintendere (o ignorare) la distinzione fra *στριφνός* e *στρυφνός* - nella sua ed. *Magni Hippocratis, medicorum omnium facile principis, opera omnia quae extant* (Francofurti 1595, p.326) lucidamente rilevava: *certe στρυφναί intellegi possunt acerbae, durae et inflexibiles et venerem aversantes, et quae nullis blandimentis emolliiri aut tractari possunt, ideoque conceptui ineptae et steriles. quomodo sentiunt omnes interpretes*. Ma la stessa *expositio* si confà anche a *donne quae resiccitae sunt et aridae, nullas fere habeant purgationes menstruae. στεριφναί etiam legi potest, ut πυκναί καὶ στερεαί indicentur, qua significatione etiam στρυφναί dici possunt, sicuti legisse Galenum existimo*.
6. Il *Vindob.med.*IV ed il *Vatic.*IV recano *στιφνός* (non attestato altrove nel *Corpus*; accolto isolatamente dal Grensemann nella sua recente edizione del tratatello, Berlin 1968). La lezione *στρυφνός* trasmessa dai *Pariss.Grr.* 2142, 2143 & 2145, risulta preferita a *στρυφνός* isolatamente in LSJ⁹, ove il nostro passo compare fra gli esempi di *στρυφνός*. Tuttavia gli esempi ippocratici ivi raccolti offrono una superflua rassegna variantistica dei luoghi ove la tradizione oscilla tra le forme in *στρυφν-* e quelle in *στρυφν-*. La puntuale indicazione delle variante tradisce l'incertezza del lessicografo: comprovata dalla presenza di *Prisc.med.*XV, ove la forma in *στρυφν-* è inammissibile. In realtà questa, come le altre sezioni del LSJ⁹ afferenti ai Medici, si deve a E.T.Withington: che nel 1925 aveva già letto 'for lexicographical purposes the whole of the extant remains of Greek medical literature' (cf. LSJ⁹ vii). D'altra parte l'edizione (1923) del II vol. dell'Ippocrate loebiano, che del *de morbo sacro* offre ancora canonico testo, fu opera, oltre che dello stesso Withington (cf. p.vi), di quel H.Stuart Jones, che nel contempo diresse la revisione di *A Greek-English Lexicon*, terminata nel 1940 con la nona ed..
7. Dopo *Cyrilli Glossarium* (cod.Marin., e rec. Schmidt) *στρία στρυφνά· βράματα αριγντά*, probabilmente archetipico, cf. Hesychius σ 2006Schm., nonché Photius, *Etym.Sym.*, *Etym.Magn.*, & *Suda*, citt..

'rilassano' il cervello stesso, permettendo quell'afflusso di flegma eccessivo, in cui consisterebbe la ἐρῆ νοῦρος: cf. xiii 10ss. τοῖσι δὲ καὶ (scil. ἡ πρόφρασις γίνεται) ἐπειδὴν ἐξαπίνης μετὰ βόρεια πνεύματα νότος μεταλάβῃ συνεστηκότα τὸν ἐγκέφαλον (cf. xiii 38s. cit. ὁ ἐγκέφαλος συνέστηκε καὶ ἐστὶ στρυγνός) καὶ εὐθενέοντα ἔλυσε καὶ ἐχάλασεν, ὥστε πλημυρεῖν τὸ φλέγμα, καὶ οὕτω τὸν κατάρροον ποιεῖται.

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S.IRELAND(Hull): *Menander and the comedy of disappointment*

In 'Menander misleading his audience' (LCM 1.8[Oct.1976], 100-102) A.G.Katsouris outlined a technique of Menandrian comedy by which the playwright induces his audience to expect one line of plot development only to produce in the event another that in many respects proves quite the reverse. By the time the article appeared, I was myself putting the finishing touches to a paper on the same feature. Significantly, however, none of our illustrative passages coincided, and it may not be without value even at this late date to offer in a somewhat shortened form my own thoughts on the subject, in order to emphasize the extent to which Menander employs the device.

It goes without saying that the richest and most immediately evident source of comedy in the plays of Menander consists of the dramatic irony injected by the poet, through which the audience is able to appreciate the various states of misapprehension under which the characters of the stage so frequently labour. It would be a mistake, however, to suggest in consequence that the poet made no use of the opposite effect, surprise. In its simplest form surprise is produced when an act occurs which is totally unforeshadowed. An instance of this might be Sostratus' proposal to reward his new-found friend Gorgias with the hand of his sister at *Dyskolos* 791ff., if we can be sure that the fragmentary dialogue which followed the withdrawal of Knemon at 758, so tantalizingly lacking in precise information as it is, did not contain a reference to such a match (see further below). In many instances, however

In many instances, however, such is the playwright's skill that the emotional response elicited from the audience by the introduction of unheralded developments is not simply the predictable reaction of surprise, but also a retrospective realization that it too has been the victim of misapprehension no less than the characters of the stage, and that much of the comic effect derives from its acceptance of this involvement. Such a complex effect, for which the term 'surprise' seems decidedly inadequate, is most prominently in evidence when foreshadowing of developments, promising the production of dramatic irony, points to a predictable outcome, though in fact the opposite proves to be the case, with the foreshadowed result either frustrated or reversed. In this way the expectations of the audience may be said to have been disappointed, just as frequently happens with the characters of the stage, and the result is what I would term the 'comedy of disappointment'.

It would be as well to admit at this point that the inclusion of surprise and the 'comedy of disappointment' as a feature of New Comedy rests almost entirely upon recognition of the fact that the original audience was prepared to accept events portrayed upon the stage as operating to a large degree on the level of reality perceived by the characters involved. For unless the audience is prepared to suspend a totally logical approach and to accept not only the conventions of the stage, but more importantly the dramatic illusion, many events carefully arranged by the playwrights to produce a maximum of dramatic effect cannot but appear totally inept.

A single instance will serve as illustration. In the *Hecyra* Terence, whose omission of the expository prologue appears calculated to increase the potential for surprise developments, places the discovery by Pamphilus and the audience of the real reason why Philumena deserted her marital home in order to return to that of her parents as early as 373ff. The discovery on the other hand that the child to which Philumena has given birth is, contrary to all belief, legitimate, is delayed until 811ff., and one can hardly doubt that the reason for this was the poet's desire to increase suspense throughout the action. Yet given the recurrent nature of themes in New Comedy plots, and that the characters were to a degree stereotyped, given too that the genre itself required a happy ending, one might ask, on a totally logical level, how else the situation could be resolved. The answer of course is that no audience approaches drama simply on the level of logic, but is prepared to accept and share that a character's perception of events around him in itself represents a form of reality.

Given then that for the audience, in contrast to the literary student, acceptance of many situations at face value is implicit in the performance, there exists within the *Dyskolos* and *Samia* a number of occasions when Menander suggests to his audience that the action will follow a certain course and will produce a number of pre-determined results, only to negate such foreshadowing. Two such instances occur in the opening scenes of the *Samia*. The first is introduced by Moschion, the 'hero' of the play, as a reaction to the news brought by the slave Parmenon that his father has just returned from abroad. In the monologue which opened the play the young man explained how during the celebration of the Adonis festival he had caused the girl next door to become pregnant, but had sworn to make amends by marrying her once their respective fathers returned from their business trip. Now that the opportunity has arisen for him to carry out his promise, his nerve, in true New Comedy fashion, deserts him and it is only the cajoling of Parmenon that induces him to maintain his earlier resolve, 63ff. It is reasonable to presume that Moschion's hesitation to approach his father and his feelings of shame at this point will have produced within the audience some expectation of objections to the match from the father, Demeas (cf. Keuls, 'The *Samia* of Menander', ZPE 10[1973], 5), and that the remainder of the play will be largely taken up with overcoming these objections. In the event, however, when Demeas and Niceratos, the father of the girl, appear, we find that a marriage between their offspring is already in

46 their minds, and when father and son eventually meet in Act II, it is clear, despite the fragmentary nature of the dialogue between them, not only that Moschion's earlier hesitation was quite out of place, but also that in some respects his father is already one jump ahead of him in his preparations (cf. Jacques, *Ménandre, La Samienne*, Paris 1971, xxi.).

In this way Menander has induced his audience to share with Moschion expectations of what the more extensive remains of Roman Comedy show to have been an almost hackneyed theme, so that when the truth is known the audience is able to enjoy not only the fact that Moschion has been under a misapprehension, but that they themselves have equally been victims of the same device. Against such an interpretation on the other hand H.-D. Blume (*Menanders Samia, Eine Interpretation*, Darmstadt 1974, 29) argues that since Demas and Niceratos were travelling companions, there could hardly be any justification for Moschion's apprehension of difficulty concerning a marriage between the two families. Such argument, however, certainly presupposes a more logical approach on the part of the audience than is perhaps either possible or dramatically desirable. Indeed, while it is conceivable that the exaggerated behaviour of a so-called professional character, like the boastfulness of Sikon in the *Dyskolos*, may be recognized by the audience as leading to an inevitable and conventional discomfiture (compare W.G. Arnott's 'irony of failure', *G&R* 15 [1968], 13f.), the argument that an audience should be able in advance selectively to recognize a negative outcome in statements which are important for the development of the plot, can hardly be entertained on a serious basis.

In the same episode the question is raised whether the child born to Moschion and Plangon in the absence of their fathers should be left with Chrysis, Demeas' mistress, to nurse. Chrysis herself has no doubts that it should, and brushes aside Moschion's prognostication that his father will resent the child's existence, sure that the love he feels for her will soon overcome any initially hostile reaction he may have. In the event, however, it is Moschion's forecast that proves closer to the truth, but since it was that of Chrysis which the stage characters, and presumably the audience, accepted, the overall effect is again one of surprise, disappointed expectation and eventual irony inherent in the spectacle of Moschion having to defend the infant before his father with patently specious argument (cf. Blume, *op.cit.*, 62ff.; Stoessl, 'Unkenntnis und Missverstehen als Prinzip und Quelle der Komik in Menanders Samia', *RhM* 116 [1973], 23ff.; id. 'Die neuen Menanderpublikation', *RhM* 112 [1969], 199f.; Keuls, 'The Samia of Menander', *ZPE* 10 [1973], 5).

Turning to the *Dyskolos* we find there too a number of instances of disappointed expectations. Following the failure of Sostratos' attempt to establish contact with Knemon through his slave Pyrrhias, what appears to be his desertion by Chaireas, and his loss of nerve when confronted by the old man, he then turns to yet another source of potential help, the household slave Getas. The description of the slave given by Sostratos at 183f., despite some dispute as to the exact meaning of the term *δούλος*, suggests a character of the *servus callidus* type so familiar from Roman adaptations (cf. Arnott, 'The confrontation of Sostratos and Gorgias', *Phoenix* 18 [1964], 111), someone whose experience may be counted upon to smooth the path of his master. Yet if the audience expects in the introduction of such a character a comedy of intrigue such as is common among the plays of Plautus, they are to be doubly disappointed: first because Getas is simply not available when Sostratos returns home for him, and second because when the slave does eventually appear, we find not the cunning slave, one of whose major characteristics was an ability to avoid work (cf. Tranio in Plautus' *Mostellaria*) but one more like Xanthias in Aristophanes' *Frogs* - all too burdened by a load he describes as enough for four donkeys (402ff.). Later too his suggested characteristics are further undermined by his singular lack of success in begging the loan of a pot from Knemon, and by the readiness with which he abandons the attempt, a lack of success moreover which Sikon, though destined to an even worse fate, serves to emphasize. In this respect Menander prepares his audience for what might be regarded as a typical play of intrigue, only to reject it in the event, with all that this implies for the reaction of the audience.

Later in the play, in the final scene of Act IV and the opening of Act V, there occurs an instance of disappointed expectations similar to those at the beginning of the *Samia*, though somewhat shorter in duration and more difficult to interpret correctly because of damage to the text. Following Knemon's departure from the stage at 758 having renounced all responsibility for the future of his daughter, one of the remaining characters, either Sostratos or Gorgias, says it now remains to betroth a sister. In the context of recent developments we may presume that it is Gorgias' sister here being referred to (for the identity of the sister contrast Stoessl, *Kommentar zu Menander Dyskolos*, Paderborn 1965, ad loc., Schäfer, *Menanders Dyskolos. Untersuchungen zur dramatischen Technik*, Meisenheim am Glan 1965, 63 & 137f., and Gomme & Sandbach, *Menander. A Commentary*, Oxford 1973, ad loc.).

This is followed by an instruction to refer the matter, presumably to another party deemed to have some interest in what is being proposed, and the fact that a father will not object. Since Gorgias is now the sole arbiter of his step-sister's fate, it is likely that the instruction comes from him and refers to Sostratos raising with his father the question of his marriage to Knemon's daughter, as indeed occurs in the interval between the Acts. The father who will not object must also be Sostratos', since Knemon has already given Gorgias a *carte blanche* in the arrangements of his family's affairs, and the prompt arrival of Kallipides at 775 thus serves as a conventional coincidence, similar to the entry of Pyrrhias at 81. The most likely interpretation of the dialogue, then, is that Sostratos will raise with his father the question of his marriage and that he envisages no difficulties in obtaining consent. At the beginning of Act V, however, Sostratos emerges from the shrine with Kallipides and his first words for a moment raise the spectre of what was so recently described as impossible, 784f.

οὐχ ὡς ἐβουλόμην ἀπαντᾶ μοι, πατήρ,
οὐδ' ὡς προσεδόκων γίνεται παρὰ σοῦ.

The effect upon the audience can hardly have been other than momentary surprise at this apparent reversal of earlier assurances, followed by a measure of relief at the discovery that

Kallipides' objections are instead to the unforeshadowed marriage alliance between Sostratos' own sister and Gorgias, which the young man must have raised in the interval between Acts. One might indeed say that the audience will feel itself involved, whether consciously or not, in a double misapprehension: first that all is not well as regards Sostratos' marriage (cf. Moschion's similar uncertainties in *Samia*), and then the realization that their fears, centred upon this apparent last-minute obstacle, are themselves unfounded. However, though Kallipides' real objections to the proposed second marriage tie with the family of Knemon are soon skilfully deflected by Sostratos' rhetorical exposition of the correct use of wealth, and the audience given the distinct impression that the second betrothal, abruptly introduced as it has been, may go ahead, these expectations are themselves in turn disappointed momentarily by Gorgias' proud reluctance to accept a union financially so unequal.

Elsewhere in the play there occur a number of instances where the prospect of developments which in the event never materialize is offered to the audience. Having failed to enlist the assistance of Getas, Sostratos now determines to give up his earlier reliance on others (an ironic development itself in view of later actions) and to approach Knemon on his own behalf. The audience will presumably have been well aware of the dangers inherent within such a plan, which could so easily have resulted in the old man behaving with characteristic violence towards someone who will ultimately become his son-in-law. This, together with the presence on stage of Gorgias, anxious to protect the honour of his step-sister, makes it hardly surprising that Sostratos should be frustrated in his intentions. Yet the presentation of the situation is not as straight-forward as might have been expected. As a result of the off-stage description by Daos of the events he witnessed between Sostratos and the girl, Gorgias' reaction to the appearance of Sostratos is typical of the rustic's prejudice against city-dwellers, 257f.

Γο. ὁ τὴν χλανίδ' ἔχων; οὗτος ἐστὶν ὃν λέγεις;

(Δα.) οὗτος.

(Γο.) κομποῦρος εὐδὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ βλέμματος

Certainly there are signs in Gorgias' opening dialogue with his slave that he differs from Knemon in a number of respects, but he here retains a general suspiciousness of strangers and a readiness to jump to conclusions over their motives, whether these are justified or not. In this respect the audience may be prepared for interaction between the two sides reminiscent of the earlier encounter between Sostratos and Knemon. In fact, however, not only is Gorgias' speech, for all its rhetoric, marked by a tone of deference, but his willingness to be won over by Sostratos reveals his character to be altogether different from that of his step-father. At the same time, however, one has to admit that the audience's reaction to the character of Gorgias may also depend to some extent upon the elements conventionally accorded the young rustic in New Comedy (cf. Gorgias in *Georgos*).

One final example may be added, though it is without doubt the most problematical of all, and ultimately depends for correct interpretation upon the more mechanical aspects of theatre production. To the modern reader, armed with the list of *dramatis personae*, it should come as little surprise that Chaireas eventually appears to abandon Sostratos in the face of the difficulties experienced by Pyrrhias. The question remains, however, whether the description given in the list is an accurate mirror of his role in the original production or merely a subsequent insertion by a scribe eager to categorize. Would in fact the mask Chaireas wore have provided the audience with the clue to the role he was to play (cf. van Groningen, *The delineation of character in Menander's Dyscolus*, *Recherches de Papyrologie* 1, 1961, 102f.; Handley, *The Dyskolos of Menander*, London 1965, ad line 48; Schäfer, *Menanders Dyskolos*, Meisenheim am Glan 1965, 35ff.; Stoessl, *Kommentar zu Menander Dyskolos*, Paderborn 1965, 16; Aloni, 'Due note menandree', *Acme* 28[1972], 215-219; Post, 'Some subtleties in Menander's Dyscolos', *AJP* 84[1963], 37ff.). With no external evidence we are forced back on to the statements made by Chaireas himself and Sostratos' reaction to them.

For certain, many of the more blatant aspects of the parasite character are absent from him, and it is largely upon his boastfulness concerning the effectiveness of his methods in assisting friends in their love escapades (57-68), followed by what Sostratos subjectively regards in his mood of frustrated annoyance as his desertion that the description as parasite must stand or fall. Sostratos himself, however, regards Chaireas from the start as a helpful friend, καὶ φίλον καὶ πρακτικόν (56), and continues to do so despite his lack of enthusiasm for Chaireas' description of his methods (cf. Anderson, 'Knemon's Hamartia', *G&R* 17[1970], 200: an added complication is that Sostratos' description of Chaireas may have been designed more to characterize Sostratos himself than his supposed friend). Such pronouncements, if the role of Chaireas was clear from the start, would certainly have been productive of Arnott's 'irony of failure'. If on the other hand the role was not clear, if indeed until his hasty departure with the promise of help at some future time the audience, like Sostratos, expected the proffered help to materialize, the effect of the desertion can only have been one of surprise, an early rejection on the playwright's part of the drama of intrigue, similar perhaps to the later one involving Getas, and disappointment of expectations that in the audience would have produced humour just as in Sostratos the result is simple pique.

Menander, we are told by ancient authorities, was a master of dramatic technique and character portrayal. Without doubt the major source of his comic technique lay in the realm of dramatic irony, but I have tried to provide some additional evidence of another, multi-faceted aspect of his skill, one which confronted the characters of the stage with developments that ran counter to their expectations, but which also drew the audience itself into those expectations and their frustration. In some cases it would perhaps be not too extreme to envisage the playwright as deliberately introducing a second stratum of irony into his work, one for which he himself was the sole audience as he manipulated the emotions of the spectators with the same consummate skill that characterized his handling of the stage action.

στόματός τε καλλιπάρου φυλακῇ κατασχεῖν | φθόγγον ὄρατον οἴκοις (Iphigenia's sacrifice). 'καλλιπάρου: an extreme example of its type, the compound adjective of which the latter element is meaningless;' Denniston and Page ad loc..

For *παῖρος* used of a face cf. Sophocles *Trach.* 12 ἀνδρείῳ κύτει βούπαρος (a river god). The compound adjective is used again by Aeschylus at *Septem* 553 (cited for this passage by Denniston and Page) βλάστημα καλλιπαῖρον, ἀνδρόπαις ἀνήρ, of Parthenopaeus, who is also described as οὔτι παρθένων ἐπώνυμον 536: καλλιπαῖρον is then surely used to stress his epicene nature (cf. παρθεν-ωπός, Euripides, *EL*.949).

The literal use of the epithet is found at Euripides *Med.* 1335 τὸ καλλιπαῖρον εἰσέβης Ἀργούσιν ὁπλός. Apart from any ornate carving this refers to the ubiquitous practice of painting the prow - often with the addition of eyes. So in Homer ships are μιλοπάρηοι (*IL*.2.637 *Od.* 9.125) and φοινικοπάρηοι (*Od.* 11.124). So as *πάρηοι* can be used of ships, so *παῖρος* can be applied to persons.

Ships at Athens have feminine names (*CIA* 2.789ff.), then as now, and Aristophanes *Eq.* 1300ff. uses παρθένου of ships; cf. Vergil, *A.* 9.120-122

*hinc uirgineae (mirabile monstrum)
quot prius aeratae steterant ad litora prorae
reddunt se totidem facies pontoque feruntur.*

The comparison of a young girl's face to the prow of a ship is then quite obvious, both are pretty and feminine, Iphigenia is looking her best, she was, after all, expecting marriage shortly.

Fraenkel ad loc. suggests that the use of *παῖρα* may have its origins in oracular and sacrificial language; this would suit the context, but I cannot agree with his statement that this is a 'weakened use of *παῖρα*', and far from being 'meaningless' the second element of this compound is admirably apposite for a writer, a city and an audience with strong nautical links.

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αἰσχίστα μὲν πρόσωπα. τοιαύτη γυνή
εἶσιν δι' ὅστος πᾶσιν ἀνδράποισ γέλως.
ἐπ' αὐχένα βραχεῖα. κινεῖται μόγις,
ἄπυγος αὐτόκωλος. ἃ τάλας ἀνήρ
ὅστις κακὸν τοιοῦτον ἀγκαλίζεται.

The original performer of the iambos certainly paused quite strongly after βραχεῖα as he had done after πρόσωπα. Whether he did so as strongly after μόγις is, to be sure, a difficult question but at the same time a scholarly one and not to be passed over with talk of 'personal preferences' (*LCM* 8.2[Feb.1983], 32).

F.D.Harvey and the Editor (loc.cit.) propose in jest that κινεῖται be altered to βινεῖται. The latter makes the insolent forecast that this proposal 'will be taken seriously in Manchester'. Not so. In Manchester the note of Walter Headlam and A.D.Knox on Herodas 5.2 has been read and pondered. Jesters, however, sometimes get near the truth unwittingly. Semonides' κινεῖται may have to do with movement on a couch rather than 'on the ground'. If so, the asyndetic pair of adjectives ἄπυγος αὐτόκωλος would not have been strongly separated from κινεῖται μόγις in the original performance, and the modern punctuator who after βραχεῖα employs a high point or a low point ought after μόγις to employ a comma.

The use of middle κινεῖσθαι with a feminine subject in a sexual context (~ Latin *crissare*) may be illustrated with Aristophanes *Lys.* 225-7 ἐάν δέ μ' ὀκνεύσῃς βιάσθαι βίᾳ ... κακῶς παρέξω κοῦχλιν προσκινήσομαι, *Pax* 255-6. Where a masculine subject is concerned (~ Latin *cevere*) Aristophanes *Nub.* 1103 ὃ κινούμενοι will serve.

Postures other than that required of the mistress of the mission are in question. A woman like our ἄπυγος αὐτόκωλος, with little flesh on her ilia and femora, even if she could make easily the movements which accompanied these postures, could not make them in a manner pleasing to her partner. Greek interest in the shape of the *πηγή* was not entirely a matter of aesthetics. Readers of *LCM* in need of detailed instruction about sexual κινήσεις should study Lucretius 4.1263-77.

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